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Abstract 
  This paper investigates CEO turnover and the usefulness of relative performance evaluation 
(RPE) as a management incentive in an emerging economy lacking market-based competition. In 
a sample of China’s listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the period 2001-2005, we find that 
41% of departing CEOs in SOEs is being promoted. The promotion is positively associated with 
preceding firm performance relative to peers in the same region and this association is more 
significant than that between the promotion and firm’s specific performance. Furthermore, the 
promotion outperforms other incentive schemes such as CEO demotions by 5%-8% in terms of 
subsequent Tobin’s Q in three years. These consequences persist in undeveloped regions where 
there are fewer firms listed on the stock market, a lower stock market capitalization, or a higher 
regional Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ). The findings imply that promotion based on RPE 
provides a critical incentive by creating competitions.  
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1. Introduction 
  Previous studies have implied that the tournament based on relative performance evaluation 
(RPE) play a crucial role in contracting because RPE gives accurate information on an agent’s 
actions in a competitive market by filtering out the common factors faced by the agent’s peers 
(Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Barro and Barro, 1990; Dye, 1992; 
Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker, 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; DeFond and Park, 1999; 
Garvey and Milbourn, 2003). However, there is little empirical evidence on this issue. This study 
attempts to fill this void by investigating the incentive role of RPE in a unique institutional setting 
in China.  
  In the market competition, RPE provides a more precise measure of the idiosyncratic efforts of 
agents by eliminating common factors such as market or industry conditions (Diamond and 
Verrechia, 1982; Holmstrom 1979, 1982). This gives a principal more accurate information on an 
agent’s effort, and thus reduces agency costs. The information role of RPE is enhanced in a 
competitive environment because agents are more likely to be subject to similar uncertainties and 
to have more peers, and because any given agent’s actions are unlikely to affect the output of other 
agents (DeFond and Park, 1999; Holmstrom, 1982). However, there is a little evidence that RPE 
is effective in environments lack of market competition as an incentive to motivate agents’ actions. 
Shleifer (1985) suggests that in theory RPE is the first-best incentive in a highly regulated 
environment in which regulators determine the price rating, and tends to motivate agents’ effort by 
artificially creating competition. A few studies provide evidence that RPE is a useful incentive in 
the public sector. For example, Besley and Case (1996) show that the economic performance of a 
state relative to neighboring states has a positive impact on the re-election prospects of US 
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governors as a consequence of the states’ relative taxation behavior.1 Matsumura and Shin (2006) 
find evidence that financial performance improves following the implementation of an incentive 
scheme that includes relative performance measures in a sample of 214 postal stores in South 
Korea, because RPE motivates reduced effort when workers perceive unfairness in competition. 
Those studies only describe the incentive role of RPE in behavioral theories given the regulated 
environment or public sectors.  
  A sample of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a natural laboratory to empirically test the 
theory of the incentive role of RPE in a weak market competition for several reasons. First, China’s 
SOEs are affiliated with the Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy, and are thus scarcely subject to 
market-based competition. Although SOEs are listed and traded on the stock, a significant portion 
of state shares remain non-tradable (Alchian, 1965; Fan et al., 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1979; 
Karpoff and Rice, 1989). As the management of SOEs remains under the authority of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), it also lacks a competitive managerial labor 
market (Li et al., 2005; Grove et al. 1995). Second, China’s government has explicitly incorporated 
relative economic performance criteria into the procedure of evaluating officials since economic 
reforms were launched in 1980s’ (Oi, 1992; Qian et al., 1997; Li et al., 2005; Qian et al., 2000). 
Government reports or yearbooks and the mass media regularly publish detailed information on 
relative provincial performance rankings in such varied areas as GDP growth, sales revenue, profit, 
steel production, and miles of road constructed. Third, there is considerable variation across 
jurisdictional regions in China in terms of both market development and the extent of government 
control. A large sample of listed SOEs affiliated with different regional governments thus allows 
                                                            
1 Besley and Case (1996) indicate that voters choose whether or not to reelect officials based on their performance 
while in office, using neighboring jurisdictions to evaluate the performance of the incumbent based on tax 
competition. 
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us to examine the incentive role of RPE tangled with institutions in regions.  
  As Chinese governments usually rely on administrative approaches such as appointment and 
remove of senior officials to administer SOEs and design the incentive schemes for managers in 
SOEs, this study investigates the research questions as follows. First, how have the incentive 
schemes been designed in SOEs and what are determinants of incentive schemes? Second, is the 
incentive scheme linked to firm performance, especially, is it linked to relative performance 
measure? Third, what consequences have those incentive schemes caused? Forth, how do those 
incentive schemes work with institutions in Chinese emerging market?  
  The results reveal several key findings. First, promotion is most frequently adopted in Chinese 
SOEs as an incentive for CEOs. Among the CEOs leaving office in the study period, 41% were 
promoted within the firm, or to the parent firm, or to another firm in higher layer of Chinese 
bureaucratic hierarchy; 15% were demoted (most often internally); 15% were rotated or reassigned 
to an equivalent-ranking position; 13% entered a government entity; 8% were imprisoned, and 8% 
were assigned another usually honorary position, such as honorary chairman or supervising board 
director. Further, the promotion occurs more frequently in SOEs affiliated with the central 
government, in SOEs located in undeveloped or poorer regions and in SOEs in regulated industries. 
Second, the promotion is significantly associated with the firm’s individual performance (ROA) 
but more significantly associated with the firm’s performance relative to peers in the region. Third, 
the promotion is positively associated with the subsequent three-year Tobin’s q and outperforms 
other incentive schemes by 5%-8%. These effects are significant in the subsample where there are 
fewer firms listed on the stock market, a lower stock market capitalization, or a higher regional 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ) value.    
  Our findings make several contributions as follows. First, it extends the literature on executive 
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compensation and incentive. DeFond and Park (1999) find that RPE is useful in highly competitive 
environments and that competitive environments are more conducive to RPE. By examining the 
use of RPE in an emerging market lack of market competition, this study complement prior studies 
by demonstrating that RPE might lead to tournament and play an important role for incentive in a 
market lack of competition. Second, our student extends the accounting literature on performance 
measures. Previous studies have cast doubt on the usefulness of accounting information in a 
developing economies such as China in which the market is less functional, government 
intervention is strong, and state-owned firms dominate (Ball et al. 2000, 2003; Bushman et al., 
2006; Fan et al. 2002; Opper, 2007; Li et al., 2004). This study implies that accounting measures 
are useful for contracting in such an environment if they are properly designed. Third, our study 
sheds insights on the corporate governance of China’s SOEs. We look into the executive incentives 
in SOEs and  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background and 
develops the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the variables measures and research model. Section 4 
describes the data and sample. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Background and Hypothesis 
2.1 Incentive schemes in China’s SOEs  
  China’s SOEs are affiliated with a huge Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy that is lack of market 
competition. The Chinese governments have ultimate ownership of SOEs that cannot be freely 
traded in the market (Alchian, 1965; Fan et al., 2007; Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Karpoff and 
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Rice, 1989).2 The lack of market competition is exacerbated by the absence of a large secondary 
owner who serves as a powerful monitor and benefits from additional firm productivity (Shleiger 
and Vishny, 1986). In such a bureaucratic hierarchy, the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC), which functions more or less as the personnel department of this enormous 
organization, ultimately controls the mobility of officials within the system, maintaining dossiers 
and tracking managerial careers.3 If an official is separated from the government hierarchy, then 
his or her career in the political system is disrupted (Li et al. 2005). Hence, Chinese government 
officials have few options outside the internal labor market.4 This highly centralized personnel 
machine relies heavily on administrative means of control such as personnel appointments and 
removes. Monetary rewards play a much less prominent role either in implicit contracts or 
remuneration in a bureau. In part, this is because the relationship between a bureaucratic superior 
and his or her subordinates is authoritative, and administrative compulsion is more likely to elicit 
compliance than would be the case under market pressure. In addition, the lock-in effect, coupled 
with the huge difference in the personal benefits of staying in power and relinquishing power, 
greatly reinforces the incentive for Chinese officials to remain in office.5 
2.2 The relative performance measure as explicit incentive in China’s SOEs 
  The Chinese government has explicitly incorporated relative performance evaluation (RPE) into 
the control mechanism of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The use of RPE encourages better economic 
                                                            
2  Although many SOEs are listed on the stock market, some or all of their state assets or shares are non-transferable. 
The restrictions on trading shares means that businesses are less subject to market forces. 
3 In China, personnel control is centralized in the hands of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government. The State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), authorized by the CCP at the state or local level and the 
government, takes responsibility for this as an investor of state-owned assets on behalf of the central or local government, and one 
of its tasks is to select and appoint the management of state-owned enterprises (please refer to the Web page of the SASAC at 
www.sasac.gov.cn for more details). 
4 Since the mid-1990s, China’s private sector, which is relatively free of the Party’s control, has grown into a large employer in 
the labor market, and there is thus a possibility for officials to quit the government and be employed by private firms.   
5 The chairman of the board of an SOE may be promoted to a leading position in the local or central government, such as Vice 
Mayor, Vice Province Governor, or State Secretary. 
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performance by artificially creating competition among regions or local governments. In the 
economic reforms implemented since the 1980s, the Chinese central government has pursued an 
explicit policy of stimulating regional competition, such as encouraging regions to “get rich first.” 
Indeed, both the lobbying position of a local government and the careers of local governor in a 
higher government entity or the central government are determined by local economic 
performance relative to similar jurisdictions or areas (Oi, 1992; Montinola et al., 1995; Qian and 
Xu, 1993; Qian and Weingast, 1997). In the contest, Chinese government would like to select 
“elites” to lead the bureaucratic hierarchy and one of the major channels of elite recruitment 
appears to promote persons based on the rankings of performance in related fields (Li and 
Bachman, 1989).6 In addition, government reports or yearbooks and the mass media regularly 
publish detailed information on relative provincial performance rankings in such varied areas as 
GDP growth, sales revenue, profit, steel production, and miles of road constructed. In an analysis 
of 520 Chinese SOEs, Maskin et al. (2000) find that firm performance across regions is more useful 
than inter-industry performance, and document a positive relationship between the lobbying status 
of a Chinese province (as measured by the ranking of the provincial per capita number of Central 
Committee members in the Party Congress) and its economic performance ranking in terms of 
growth rate one year before the Party Congress.7 Second, the use of RPE may be especially helpful 
in less competitive markets to mitigate the information costs and efficiency problems arising from 
political competition encouraged by the central government. In the appraisals of SOE managers, 
the government or regulator may evaluate economic outcomes by firm-specific earnings, thus 
                                                            
6 By analyzing 247 mayors of 1986 in China, Li and Bachman (1989) find that more than 80 percent have worked in industrial 
fields and taken the superior position such as factory director. They state that elites will be co-opted to serve in various formal 
organizations, and will be expected to defend and advance institutional interests. 
7 Chen et al. (2005) find that the turnover of provincial leaders hinges on provincial economic performance relative to their 
immediate predecessors. 
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requiring firms to reveal private information (Stigler, 1971; Laffont, 1994).8 9 When RPE is used, 
an SOE’s performance is related to other similar firms in the same region. In this case managers 
may make greater effort to adjust to changes in circumstances to improve firm performance, much 
as they would in a competitive market.  
  This setting with weak market competition and the explicit policy of RPE make it ideal to test 
the incentive and the role RPE for incentive.  
 
3. Variables and models 
3.1 Incentive schemes in China’s SOEs 
  Based on administrative means of personnel control in China’s SOEs (Huang, 1998), we classify 
the incentives as follows:  
  Promotion. Promotion has substantial motivation effects when employees know in advance that 
there is a likelihood of promotion and are aware of the personal benefits afforded by the higher 
position. According to Gibbs (1996), promotion is usually based on one of two extreme models: 
the first is to run a contest or tournament and the second is to set a quota or absolute performance 
standard. Although these seemingly disparate means are almost identical in terms of their incentive 
properties, the tournament model based on relative performance measures is generally more 
applicable in empirical work. Lazear and Rosen (1981) suggest that it might be less costly to 
observe relative performance than to measure the level of a worker’s individual output when 
monitoring is so difficult that moral hazard is a serious problem. While promotion on the basis of 
                                                            
8 More precisely, under the Chinese political hierarchy, the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
governs China’s SOEs on behalf of the state or local government (see the graph in Appendix B). SOEs officially report their 
operational performance to the SASAC in their respective jurisdiction, and the SASAC at the local level reports directly to the 
administrative level of the SASAC directly above it. The SASAC of the State Council reports directly to the State Council. 
9 The SASAC’s mandate includes the drafting of laws and regulations regarding state-owned assets, the management of state 
assets, and the hiring and firing of the top executives of SOEs. 
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RPE might be preferable in an undeveloped market with a serious monitoring problem such as the 
information cost and efficiency problems mentioned above, it is an open issue to be tested. Here, 
promotion is identified as: i) a CEO being appointed as chairman of the board or vice-chairman 
within a firm; ii) a chairman of the board or CEO being appointed as a senior executive in the 
parent firm; iii) a chairman of the board or a CEO being appointed as a senior executive in another 
SOE in an equivalent bureaucratic layer or to an equal-ranking position in another SOE in a higher 
bureaucratic layer. 
  Entering government. Future opportunities for SOE managers include entering a government 
entity to take up a position in an industrial bureau or administrative division of the government or 
even as a governor, such as a mayor, provincial governor, or party secretary. The incentive effect 
derives from SOE managers observing that government positions will not be snatched up by 
outsiders every time they become available, and that incumbents in these positions are afforded 
certain privileges, such as a secretary, company car, and access to political resources. 
  Rotation. Rotation is a practice whereby officials are regularly rotated in bureaucratically 
equivalent positions. For example, the CEO of ChinaTelecom Co., a company held by the central 
government, may be reassigned to manage ChinaUnicom Co., which is also held by the central 
government. A chairman of the board or CEO taking up an equivalent position in an SOE affiliated 
with the equivalent layer of government is classed as a rotation. 
  Demotion. Demotion is defined as: i) a chairman of the board being appointed as the director, 
CEO, or executive of the firm or other SOE affiliated with the equivalent bureaucratic layer; and 
ii) a CEO being appointed as a non-chief executive in the firm or other SOE affiliated with the 
equivalent bureaucratic layer. Relinquishing power greatly reinforces the incentive for SOE 
managers, because terminated managers lose the major source of benefits associated with such 
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power. Existing studies, which focus on privately held firms in developed market economies, have 
tested the relation between the forced management turnover (presumably demotion) and firm 
performance. For example, some demonstrate that forced management turnover is significantly 
negatively associated with firm-specific accounting performance (Brickley, 2003; EHW, 2003; 
Kaplan, 1994; Weisbach, 1988); others find that the disciplinary turnover is negatively related to 
the RPE (Cannella et al. 1995; DeFond et al., 1999; Huson et al., 2003). 
  Imprisonment. If SOE managers engage in gross misconduct, then they may suffer consequences 
beyond losing their jobs or being demoted or fined, such as serving a prison sentence. The risk of 
litigation acts as an incentive in undeveloped markets while legal enforcement is weak (Sun et al., 
2006).   
  Other honorary positions. The managers of SOEs may be assigned to an honorary yet virtually 
powerless position, such as honorary chairman of the board, non-executive director of the board, 
grass-roots party secretary, or chairman of a supervisory committee. Whatever gloss may be put 
on this, they lose the decision rights that they had as chairman of the board or CEO. Because the 
difference in these positions is subtle, they are grouped under the heading “other honorary 
positions.”   
 
3.2 Relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
  In an attempt to encourage regions to “get rich first,” the Chinese government evaluates 
economic performance by comparing performance between regions. For the administration of the 
nation, China is partitioned into jurisdictions based on provincial units. There are 31 provincial 
units, including four directly ruled municipalities, 22 provinces, and five autonomous regions.10 
                                                            
10 The four direct-ruled municipalities are Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, and Chongqing. The 22 provinces are Heibei, Shanxi, 
Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, 
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Based on this jurisdictional partitioning, the Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy broadly consists of 
four layers for administration of SOEs: central, provincial, municipal, and county (see Appendix 
A for more details). Hence, SOEs in the same bureaucratic layer and located in the same provincial 
unit are defined as a reference group. There are 124 (31 provincial units * 4 layers) reference 
groups in total. The RPE is then defined as a firm i’s return on assets (ROA) less the average ROA 
in the reference group. 
 
3.3 Other factors  
itSIZE , which is measured as the log of the total assets of a firm, is a proxy for firm size. Berry et 
al. (2000) suggest that an increase in size increases management entrenchment, and thus top 
executives are less likely to be found “incompetent.” 
itDA , which is the debt-to-assets ratio of a firm, is a proxy for leverage risk or financial distress. 
This is included because Gilson (1990) provides evidence that management turnover is greater in 
financially distressed firms. 
itOWNERSHIP , which is the percentage of state ownership ultimately held by the government, is 
a proxy for the level of government ownership. Highly concentrated ownership will presumably 
give the controlling shareholder more incentive to monitor management (La Porta et al., 2000). 
When the incumbent manager is doing a poor job, the controlling owner has a strong incentive to 
select the “right” person to ensure that management acts in his or her interests (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This factor often determines the adoption by state owners of 
administrative means as an incentive. 
                                                            
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai. The five autonomous regions are Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, 
Ningxia, and Xinjiang. 
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itIndusmb , which is the industry (two-digit SIC code) median market-to-book ratio, is a surrogate 
for the investment opportunity set (IOS). Previous research indicates that the IOS may be 
associated with management change because firms with a good IOS demand high-quality 
managers and thus engage in more frequent management changes (Smith and Watts, 1992).  
AGE is included because it affects the retirement or termination incentives. When an incumbent 
chairmen or CEO is close to retirement, the incentive effect of promotion should be stronger (Kale 
et al., 2009). 
itEmployee , which is the log of the number of employees in a firm, is included to control for the 
effect of political factors on the selection of managers by the Chinese political hierarchy, because 
both SOEs and politicians have a social obligation to maintain the rate of employment (Fan et al., 
2007).  
itGDP , which is the log of the local (provincial) gross domestic product (GDP), is included to 
control for variety in economic conditions across regions (Fan et al., 2007).  
itHHI , which is the industrial Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by two-digit SIC code,11 is included 
to control for industrial competition. Strong industrial competition reinforces the usefulness of 
RPE in contracts (DeFond and Park, 1999).  
 
4. Data and sample  
                                                            
11  The industrial HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in an industry and then summing the 
resulting numbers. It is expressed as  
 
HHI = s1^2 + s2^2 + s3^2 + ... + sn^2, where sn is the market share of the ith firm in the industry.  
 
The closer a market is to being a monopoly, the higher its level of ownership concentration (and the weaker its competition). If, 
for example, there were only one firm in an industry, then that firm would have a 100% market share, and the HHI would equal 
10,000 (100^2), indicating a monopoly. In contrast, if there were thousands of firms competing in an industry, then each would 
have a nearly 0% market share, and the HHI would be close to zero, indicating near perfect competition. 
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4.1 Data  
  Regarding CEO’s turnover, we track where a CEO has gone after being removed by reading the 
annual reports of the firms and searching the major news and business publications, including the 
top 50 newspapers and news wire services. Firms are excluded from the sample if a CEO was 
removed due to “natural” reasons, which include i) natural retirement or the expiration of an acting 
position; ii) death; iii) change of ownership, such as privatization; and iv) resignation, or if there 
are missing values. The final sample includes 462 listed SOEs in China for the period 2001 to 
2005. 
  All of the financial data, including return on assets (ROA), total assets, debt, sales, percentage 
shareholding, market-to-book ratio, managers’ ages, number of employees, and Tobin’s q, are 
obtained from the China Securities Markets and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The 
institutional data, such as local (provincial) GDP, are collected from government yearbooks.  
   
4.2 Sample description 
  Table 1 shows the number and frequency of incentive schemes used in SOEs from the raw data 
without processing the other variables. The sample consists of 1,159 firm years in the period 2001 
to 2005in which a CEO left his or her position. After leaving office, 41 percent of CEOs were 
promoted, among which half were promoted to the position of chairman or vice-chairman within 
the firm and the other half were promoted to top management in the parent firm. In addition, 15 
percent of removed CEOs get demoted, 15% being rotated, 13% entering government, 8% being 
imprisoned, and 8% taking an honorary position.  
[Table 1] 
  Table 2 shows the distribution of the incentive schemes by partitions based on institutions. The 
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Panel A of Table 2 presents the distribution by bureaucratic layers with which SOEs are affiliated. 
The promotion is more commonly used for incentives in all bureaucratic layers, compared with 
other incentives. At the central level of administration,12  especially, promotion occurs more 
frequently than that at other local levels of administration, 43% of removed CEOs being promoted 
(10% more than that at the county level). CEOs at the county level are more frequently demoted. 
CEOs at the middle level - the city level or provincial level, are more likely to enter governments 
or be imprisoned.    
  The Panel B of Table 2 presents the distribution of the sample by regions ranked by local 
GDPs.13 The frequency of promotion (50%) is the highest in the poorest area, the North, where 
the market is undeveloped and market forces are weakest. The frequency of demotion or 
imprisonment is higher in the richer areas of the Northeast and East. The potential reasons are that 
the regulations and legal enforcement are more effective in more developed areas. The frequency 
of entering government is 21% in the less developed area - the Southwest.  
  The Panel C of Table 2 describes the distribution of the sample by industries according to the 
one-digit Chinese SEC code. The table shows that promotion is more common in the regulated 
industries. For example, there are 41% of CEOs being promoted in the mining (B) industry, 59% 
in the power, oil, and water (D) industries, 44% in the transportation (F) industry, and 50% in the 
banking and finance (I) industries. In strategic industries such as telecoms (G) and banking and 
                                                            
12 There are several layers of government ownership: central, provincial, municipal, and county (please see details in Appendix 
A). Save for the central level, the other levels are called local government ownership. As central government ownership of such 
companies as energy or defense-related firms is considered key to national security, the central government maintains significant 
absolute or relative controlling stakes in these enterprises, and central government ownership occupies a substantial share of the 
economy. 
13 According to the Government Yearbook, China is partitioned into six administrative areas: North, which consists of five 
provincial units (Beijing, Tianjing, Heibei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia); Northeast, which consists of three provincial units 
(Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang); East, which consists of seven provincial units (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, 
Jiangxi, and Shandong); Central, which consists of six provincial units (Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, and 
Hainan); Southwest, which consists of five provincial units (Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Tibet); and Northwest, 
which consists of five provincial units (Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang). The less developed areas are poorer, 
with a lower GDP. 
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finance (I), the rotation of key personnel is more frequent. The agricultural production (A) and 
media and communications (L) industries have a lower frequency of promotion and a higher 
frequency of demotion. In the heavy construction (E) and transportation (F) industries, which are 
critical to the national economy, and in the social service and infrastructure (K) industries, 
chairmen and CEOs are more frequently appointed as government officials, and are also most 
frequently appointed as top-ranking government leaders. Criminal conduct most frequently occurs 
in the real estate (J), social service and infrastructure (K), and media and communications (L) 
industries. This implies that managerial misconduct in these industries carries a greater litigation 
risk. In summary, the results imply that promotion is the most frequently used incentive scheme in 
the higher bureaucratic layers of government control and in the poorer or undeveloped regions and 
regulated industries where the market is less free. 
[Table 2] 
  Panel A of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample firms and shows the tests of 
differences. A control group consists of firms without CEO turnover. The comparison is between 
firms with different incentive schemes and the control group. The first two variables are firm-
specific accounting measures of firm performance used in previous studies (Engel et al., 2003; 
Chang and Wong, 2004; Kato and Long, 2006; Weisbach, 1988). Firms in which the departing 
manager was promoted on average demonstrate both positive current performance ( itROA ) and 
positive lagged performance ( 1itROA ). The average lagged performance ( 1itROA ) is significantly 
higher in this sample than in the non-turnover sample (t-value = -2.39, significant at the 5% level). 
Firms in which the departing manager was demoted on average underperform those in the non-
turnover sample in terms of both current and lagged performance ( itROA : t-value = 2.09, 
significant at the 5% level; 1itROA : t-value = 1.78, significant at the 10% level). Firms in which 
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the departing manager was assigned to another honorary position also on average underperform 
those in the non-turnover sample in terms of both measures of firm-specific performance ( itROA : 
t-value = 2.43, significant at the 5% level; 1itROA : t-value = 2.55, significant at the 5% level). 
Although the firms in which the departing manager was imprisoned underperform the control 
group, the difference is not significant.  
The next variable of interest is the RPE measure. The lagged performance ( 1itRPE ) is 
significantly higher in the turnover sample than in the non-turnover sample (t-value = -2.01, 
significant at the 5% level). Firms in which the departing manager was assigned to another 
honorary position on average underperform the non-turnover group in terms of relative 
performance (t-value = 2.28, significant at the 5% level for 1itRPE ).  
Several of the firm characteristics variables are also associated with management change. Firm 
size, as proxied by itSIZE , has a significant effect on certain incentive schemes, with demotion and 
rotation occurring significantly more often in smaller firms compared with the control group. 
However, firm size does not significantly affect the frequency of promotion, entering government, 
imprisonment, or assignment to another honorary position. itDA , which is the debt-to-assets ratio 
of a firm, is a proxy for leverage risk or financial distress. Firms in which the departing manager 
was rotated have a significantly lower leverage risk (t-value = 2.87, significant at the 1% level). 
Firms in which the departing manager was promoted also have a lower leverage risk, but the 
difference is not significant. Firms in which the departing manager was imprisoned have a higher 
leverage risk, but again the difference is not significant. itOWNERSHIP , or the percentage of state 
ownership ultimately held by the government as a proxy for government ownership, has a limited 
impact, in that firms in which the departing manager was rotated have a significantly higher level 
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of government ownership (t-value = -1.96, significant at the 5% level for itOWNERSHIP ). There is 
almost no difference in the level of government ownership between the promotion group and the 
control sample. None of the other between-group differences are significant. 
itIndusmb (industry median market-to-book ratio by two-digit SIC code), which is a surrogate 
for the investment opportunity set (IOS), has some effect in firms in which the departing manager 
was promoted or rotated, as their IOS ( itIndusmb ) is significantly higher. There is no significant 
difference in the values for this variable among the other groups. Excluding natural retirement or 
termination, Table 3 shows AGE to have some effect, with managers forced to leave office being 
on average significantly younger than the managers in the control sample. Among those forced to 
leave or reappointed, however, the promotion group has the highest average age of 47.1 years. 
This is consistent with the argument of Kale et al. (2009) that when an incumbent chairmen or 
CEO is close to retirement, the incentive effect of promotion should be stronger. Finally, the 
remaining variables affecting management change are institutional factors. itEmployee , which is 
the log of the number of employees and controls for the effect of non-economic factors on the 
selection of managers, is significantly lower in the demotion, rotation, and entering government 
incentive groups. However, there is no significant difference between the promotion group and the 
control sample. itGDP  is the log of local (provincial) GDP and controls for variation in economic 
conditions across regions (Fan et al., 2007). In the sample of firms in regions with a significantly 
lower local GDP, which indicates a poorer or undeveloped economic environment, only the 
promotion incentive is adopted. itHHI , which is the industrial Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by 
two-digit SIC code and controls for industrial competition, is higher among firms in which the 
departing manager entered government, indicating that these firms operate in near-monopoly 
industries. The group of firms in which the departing manager was reassigned to another honorary 
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position are mainly in the more competitive industries with a lower industrial HHI.  
 [Table 3: Panel A] 
 
5. Results  
5.1 Association between incentive schemes and prior firm performance 
  This section presents empirical evidence on the relation between incentive schemes and 
preceding RPE. Logistic regression model is employed for the data analysis. The dependent 
variable is the likelihood of an incentive scheme, whether demotion, rotation, promotion, 
entering government, imprisonment, or being assigned another honorary position, being used. 
The independent variable is the preceding performance of the firm (preceding RPE), and 
personal features, institutional factors, and the preceding firm characteristics are included as 
control variables. Industry dummy and year dummy variables are also included, but for the sake 
of brevity the results are not reported in the table. Table 4 reports the summary results of the 
logistic regressions.  
  There is evidence to support the usefulness of RPE in promotion incentive schemes. After 
deleting the top and bottom 1% of the distribution for the financial variables used in the 
regression, the final sample consists of 462 unique SOEs and 2,056 firm-year observations, 
including all listed SOEs that underwent and did not undergo management change. As reported 
in the table, the likelihood of promotion is significantly positively associated with the firm’s 
preceding firm-specific accounting performance (coefficient of 1itROA = 3.91; p-value = 0.093) 
and also significantly positively associated with the firm’s preceding relative accounting 
performance (coefficient of 1itRPE = 3.82; p-value = 0.060). However, its sensitivity to RPE 
( 1itRPE ) is more significant. Among the control variables, 1itGDP  is significantly negatively 
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associated with the likelihood of promotion, supporting the usefulness of RPE as an incentive in 
less developed markets. 1itHHI  is significantly positively associated with the likelihood of 
promotion. This result can be explained by the argument of DeFond and Park (1999) that the 
usefulness of RPE is greater in highly competitive industries. Previous studies also demonstrate 
that when firm performance deteriorates, shareholders are likely to discipline managers by 
demoting them or terminating their positions (Banker and Datar, 1989; Bushman et al., 2004; 
Chang and Wong, 2004; Engel et al., 2003; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Kato and Long, 
2006; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Weisbach, 1988). As suggested by these studies, the 
likelihood of demotion is negatively associated with the firm’s preceding firm-specific 
accounting performance (coefficient of 1itROA = -0.39), but not significantly so (p-value = 
0.895), and significantly positively associated with the departing manager’s age (coefficient of 
AGE = -1.95; p-value = 0.075). In addition, the likelihood of imprisonment is significantly 
negatively associated with the firm’s preceding firm-specific accounting performance 
(coefficient of 1itROA = -3.81; p-value = 0.090). This is consistent with evidence in previous 
studies that when firms violate regulations or laws, they suffer severe financial distress (Sun and 
Zhang, 2006; Agrawal, et al., 1999). Imprisonment is more likely to occur in more developed 
regions with a higher GDP. This may be because legal enforcement in these regions is stronger. 
Interestingly, managers demoted or imprisoned are generally younger in age.    
[Table 4] 
 
5.2 Incentive schemes and subsequent firm performance 
5.2.1 Univariate tests 
  Panel B of Table 3 shows that the average Tobin’s q for the promotion group of firms is higher, 
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and the difference is positively significant. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample 
firms using between-group mean tests. As in Panel A, where the sample consisting of firms in 
which there was no management change is taken as the control group, the average firm 
performance after the adoption of an incentive scheme is reported and its difference from the 
average for the control sample is tested. The average Tobin’s q is highest in the year of promotion 
among all firms in the management change sample and significantly higher than the control group. 
The average Tobin’s q 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years after promotion remains high, and is second 
only to that of the entering government incentive, although the difference is not significant. 
Although the entering government group has the highest Tobin’s q over the long term, the 
difference is not significant. In contrast, the demotion group has the lowest post Tobin’s q. The 
average Tobin’s q 1 or 2 years after demotion is significantly lower than that of the control group 
(significant at the 1% level). The average Tobin’s q 3 years after demotion is also significantly 
lower than that of the control group, although at the 10% significance level. The reassignment to 
another honorary position group also has a lower post Tobin’s q that is significantly lower than 
that of the control group 2 or 3 years after incentive implementation (both significant at the 1% 
level). In summary, disciplinary mechanisms such as demotion provide a weaker management 
incentive, whereas promotion and entering government may provide a stronger incentive under the 
Chinese political hierarchy, which is characterized by a lack of free-market conditions or 
competitive managerial labor market.     
[Table 3: Panel B] 
 
5.2.2 Regression results 
  Regression analyses are performed to examine the effects of incentive schemes with RPE on 
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firm performance (post-performance). The dependent variable is post-performance, which is the 
average Tobin’s q 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years after the incentive scheme was implemented. The 
independent variables include dummy variables for the incentive schemes, relative performance 
evaluation (RPE), and the interaction between an incentive scheme and RPE. When an incentive 
scheme is chosen as the test variable, the remaining schemes are included as control variables. For 
example, when “promotion” is the test variable, the dummy variables of demotion, rotation, 
entering government, imprisonment, and assignment to another position are included as control 
variables. The industry dummy and year dummy variables are also included, but for the sake of 
brevity are not reported in the table.  
  Using the sample of all listed SOEs that underwent and did not undergo management changes, 
the multivariate regression results show no significant evidence that promotion with RPE is 
positively associated with the post Tobin’s q. The dummy variable for promotion is positively 
associated with the Tobin’s q 1, 2, and 3 years after the implementation of the incentive scheme 
(coefficients are 0.08, 0.06, 0.05 respectively), but not significantly so. The association between 
the interaction of promotion and RPE is mixed and insignificant. As with “promotion,” the dummy 
variable for entering government is also positively and insignificantly associated with the post 
Tobin’s q. Interestingly, the interaction of entering government and RPE is significantly and 
negatively associated with the Tobin’s q 2 years after implementation. Although it improves firm 
performance significantly, the entering government incentive relies less on the use of RPE. In the 
regression, the dummy variable for demotion is negatively associated with the post Tobin’s q, but 
not significantly so. The dummy variable for rotation is significantly and negatively associated 
with the Tobin’s q 1, 2, and 3 years after implementation. The interaction of rotation and RPE is 
significantly and negatively associated with the Tobin’s q 1 year after implementation. These 
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findings imply that rotation, which also relies less on RPE, decreases a firm’s post-change 
performance. Overall, rotation provides a significantly weaker management incentive. Consistent 
with the statistics in Panel B of Table 3, demotion provides a weaker incentive, but not significantly 
so. Promotion and entering government provide a stronger incentive, but again not significantly 
so.     
[Table 5] 
  To provide more evidence on the effect of incentive schemes with RPE, the whole sample is 
partitioned into two subsamples according to the level of market competition in the region or 
provincial unit. The regression model testing the effect of promotion in Section 5.2 is run again. 
Again, the independent variables include a dummy variable for promotion, relative performance 
evaluation (RPE), the interaction of promotion and RPE, dummy variables for the other incentive 
schemes, an industry dummy, and year dummies. 
Table 6 shows that promotion and the interaction of promotion with RPE are significantly 
positively associated with the post Tobin’s q in regions with weak market-based competition. 
Panel A partitions the sample into high- and low-competition subsamples by the yearly median 
value of the number of firms listed in a given region (province) (LLSV, 1997). The results show 
that the dummy variable for promotion is significantly and positively associated with the Tobin’s 
q 1 and 2 years after management change if there are fewer listed firms in a region, which 
indicates that the market is undeveloped and less competitive. The interaction of promotion and 
RPE is also significantly positive for the Tobin’s q 1 and 2 years after implementation in 
undeveloped and less competitive regions (the effect of 1*Pr itRPEomotion on the Tobin’s q 1 
year after implementation is 17.57 with a p-value of 0.026, and that of the Tobin’s q 2 years after 
implementation is 13.55 with a p-value of 0.096). However, the positive effect of promotion with 
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RPE does not persist nor is it significant for firms in regions with a greater number of listed 
firms. Panel B partitions the sample by the yearly median value of stock market capitalization in 
a region (province) (LLSV, 1997).14 The results show that the dummy variable for promotion 
and the interaction of promotion and RPE are significantly positively associated with the Tobin’s 
q 1and 2 years after implementation for firms in regions with a lower stock market capitalization 
in which the market is undeveloped and less competitive. Consistent with Panel A, the positive 
effect of promotion with RPE does not persist nor is it significant for firms in regions with a 
higher stock market capitalization. Panel C divides the sample by the yearly median value of the 
number of initial public offerings of equity in a region (province) (LLSV, 1997). The results 
show that the dummy variable for promotion and the interaction of promotion and RPE are 
positive, but not significantly so, if fewer firms issue IPOs in a given region (province), thus 
implying a less developed market. However, the dummy variable for promotion and the 
interaction of promotion and RPE are negative and not significant when more firms issue IPOs in 
a region (province). Panel D partitions the sample by the yearly median value of the regional 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ) in a region (province) (DeFond and Park, 1999).15 
Differing from the aforementioned partitioning scenarios, a higher HHI index indicates a 
monopoly or a less competitive market, whereas a value close to zero indicates near perfect 
competition. The results show that the dummy variable for promotion and the interaction of 
                                                            
14 Stock market capitalization is the number of shares times the market price per share (if the state shares are non-tradable, then 
the market price of tradable shares is used as the market price per share). 
15  The regional HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a region or provincial unit, and then 
summing the resulting numbers. It is expressed as  
 
HHI = s1^2 + s2^2 + s3^2 + ... + sn^2, where sn is the market share of the ith firm in a region or provincial unit.  
 
The closer a market is to being a monopoly, the higher its level of ownership concentration (and the weaker its competition). If, 
for example, there were only one firm in a region or provincial unit, that firm would have a 100% market share, and the HHI 
would equal 10,000 (100^2), indicating a monopoly. In contrast, if there were thousands of firms competing, then each would 
have a nearly 0% market share, and the HHI would be close to zero, indicating near perfect competition. 
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promotion and RPE are significantly positively associated with the Tobin’s q 1 year after the 
implementation of an incentive scheme or management change for firms in regions with a higher 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ) and thus an undeveloped and less competitive market. The 
positive effect of promotion with RPE on the Tobin’s q 2 and 3 years after implementation 
remains, but is not significant. Consistently, the effect of promotion with RPE on post-
performance is negative and insignificant for firms in regions with a lower Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index ( HHI ). Partitioning the sample provides evidence that promotion with RPE is 
a stronger management incentive in regions lacking market-based competition.  
 [Table 6] 
 
6. Conclusion 
  The primary motivation for this study is to empirically examine the incentives and usefulness 
of relative performance evaluation (RPE) for incentives in an emerging market lack of market 
competition. A sample of Chinese SOEs is used for testing this argument for two reasons. First, 
China’s SOEs are affiliated with governments without free-market conditions and competitive 
managerial labor market. Second, the Chinese government formally incorporates RPE in the 
control mechanisms for administration.  
  The findings of this study show that promotion is the most frequently used for incentives in 
SOEs. Regression analysis shows that promotion is more significantly associated with a firm’s 
preceding RPE. Then the effects of promotion on firm performance after a CEO turnover is 
examined, and the results show that promotion results in a higher Tobin’s q than other incentive 
schemes. Further, we conduct the tests based on subsamples partitioned by the level of market 
competition and find that the promotion is significantly and positively associated with Tobin’s q 1 
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and 2 years in subsequent periods in regions with fewer listed firms, a lower stock market 
capitalization, or a higher regional Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ), implying the promotion 
provides a positive incentive in an undeveloped and less competitive market.  
APPENDIX 
Appendix A: the characteristics of Chinese bureaucratic layers (source: Chinese 
Government Year Books) 
From the bottom to top, there are four layers of administration of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
based on the jurisdictions. The provincial units are basic jurisdictional partitions. 
1. County level 
   This level is under the jurisdiction of the county level and consists of around 2,148 counties 
and 48,697 townships. 
2. Municipal level  
   This level is under the jurisdiction of the municipal level and consists of around 333 
municipalities/cities. 
3. Provincial level 
   This level consists of 22 provinces including Heibei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shanxi, Gansu, and Qinghai; the five autonomous regions 
including Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, and Xinjiang; as well as the 4 “directly ruled 
municipalities” of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing (Chongqing was affiliated with 
Sichuan Province before 1997 but has been one of the “directly ruled municipalities” since then). 
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4. Central level 
The central level is the ultimate level and the Central Government (guided by the 
Communist Party) holds the ultimate control rights. 
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Table 1: Incentive plans for the administration of CEOs in China’s SOEs during 2001-2005.   This table 
summarizes the number and frequency of SOEs adopting the administrative means for incentive mechanism 
such as promotion, demotion, rotation, entering government entities, imprisonment and others in a sample 
of raw data. The total sample consists of 1650 firm-year observations where CEO has been forced to leave 
the office in the SOEs. The observation number shows the number of sample. Freq. shows the percentage 
of the total sample.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Incentive plans for CEOs in China’s SOEs by partitions. 
 Classification of CEO turnover   Observation No. Freq. 
Demotion 183 0.15 
Promotion 
    Within firm 238 0.21 
    To parent firm 220 0.19
    To the other firm within bureaucratic hierarchy  16 0.01 
    subtotal 474 0.41 
Rotation 169 0.15 
Entering government 
    Industry bureau 54 0.05 
    Administration division 57 0.05 
    Governor of government 38 0.03 
    subtotal 149 0.13 
Imprisonment 96 0.08 
Others 
    As board director 40 0.03 
    As party sectary/supervisory committee/honorary position 48 0.04 
    subtotal 88 0.08 
Total   1159 1.00 
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Panel A: this table summarizes the number and frequency of SOEs adopting the administrative means for 
incentive mechanism such as promotion, demotion, rotation, entering government entities, imprisonment 
and others by four bureaucratic layers – the county, city, province and central level. The total sample 
consists of 1650 firm-year observations where CEO has been forced to leave the office in the SOEs. No. 
shows the number of sample. Freq. shows the percentage of the total sample in the bureaucratic layer.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  County   City   Province   Central 
  No. Freq.   No. Freq.   No. Freq.  No. Freq. 
Demotion 10 0.23 51 0.16 69 0.16  47 0.14 
Rotation 10 0.23 35 0.11 46 0.1  78 0.22 
Promotion    
    Within firm 9 0.21 80 0.25 92 0.21  61 0.18 
    To parent firm 3 0.07 47 0.15 88 0.2  82 0.24 
    To the other firm within bureaucratic 
hierarchy 2 0.05 
 6 0.02  4 0.01  4 0.01 
    subtotal 14 0.33 133 0.42 184 0.42  147 0.43 
Entering government     
    Industry bureau - - 20 0.06 20 0.05  14 0.04 
    Administration division 2 0.05 10 0.03 35 0.08  10 0.03 
    Governor of government 2 0.05 8 0.02 15 0.03  13 0.04 
    subtotal 4 0.1 38 0.11 70 0.16  37 0.11 
Imprisonment 1 0.02 43 0.13 31 0.07  21 0.06 
Others    
    As board director 3 0.07 13 0.04 20 0.05  10 0.03 
    As party sectary/supervisory 
committee/honorary position 1 0.02 
 11 0.03  23 0.05  8 0.02 
    subtotal 4 0.09 24 0.07 43 0.1  18 0.05 
Total 43 1   324 1   443 1   348 1 
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Table 2: Incentive plans for CEOs in China’s SOEs by partitions. 
Panel B: this table summarizes the number and frequency of SOEs adopting the administrative means for incentive mechanism such as promotion, 
demotion, rotation, entering government entities, imprisonment and others by six administrative areas - North, Northeast, East, Central, Southwest 
and Northwest. The total sample consists of 1650 firm-year observations where the chairman or CEO has been forced to leave the office in the SOEs. 
No. shows the number of sample. Freq. shows the percentage of the total sample in the area.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  North   Southwest   Northwest   Northeast   East   Central 
 (Mean GDP 
36.32*) 
 (Mean GDP 
41.31*) 
 (Mean GDP 
45.55*) 
 (Mean GDP 
46.58*) 
 (Mean GDP 
87.18*) 
 (Mean GDP 
99.79*) 
  No. Freq.   No. Freq.   No. Freq.  No. Freq. No. Freq. No. Freq. 
Demotion 18 0.12 19 0.18 32 0.12  19 0.21 49 0.19 40 0.14 
Rotation 34 0.23 12 0.12 41 0.16  10 0.11 22 0.08 50 0.17 
Promotion  
    Within firm 34 0.23 27 0.26 59 0.22  14 0.16 46 0.18 62 0.21 
    To parent firm 38 0.26 11 0.11 48 0.18  19 0.21 55 0.21 49 0.17 
    To the other firm within 
bureaucratic hierarchy 1 0.01 
 1 0.01  0 0  0 0  7 0.03  7 0.02 
    subtotal 73 0.5 39 0.38 107 0.4  33 0.37 108 0.42 118 0.4 
To government entities  
    Industry bureau 5 0.03 8 0.08 8 0.03  6 0.07 12 0.05 15 0.05 
    Administration division 1 0.01 5 0.05 18 0.07  4 0.04 10 0.04 19 0.07 
    Governor of government 2 0.01 8 0.08 3 0.01  8 0.09 7 0.03 10 0.03 
    subtotal 8 0.05 21 0.21 29 0.11  18 0.2 29 0.12 44 0.15 
Imprisonment 5 0.03 9 0.09 26 0.1  3 0.03 25 0.1 28 0.09 
Others  
    As board director 5 0.03 2 0.02 11 0.04  5 0.06 12 0.05 11 0.04 
    As party sectary/supervisory 
committee/honorary position 3 0.02 
 2 0.02  17 0.06  2 0.02  15 0.06  4 0.01 
    subtotal 8 0.05 4 0.04 28 0.1  7 0.08 27 0.11 15 0.05 
Total 146 1   104 1   263 1   90 1   260 1   295 1 
* money unit= 1 million RMB 
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Table 2: Incentive plans for CEOs in China’s SOEs by partitions. 
Panel C: this table summarizes the number and frequency of SOEs adopting the administrative means for incentive mechanism such as promotion, 
demotion, rotation, entering government entities, imprisonment and others by 1-digit industry. The total sample consists of 1650 firm-year 
observations where the chairman or CEO has been forced to leave the office in the SOEs. No. shows the number of sample. Freq. shows the 
percentage of the total sample in the industry.   
  A   B *   C   D *   E   F *   G 
 Agriculture 
production 
 Mining 
 
 
Manufacturing 
&Petro-
chemicals 
 Power,  
oil & water 
 Heavy  
construction 
 Transportation  Telecom 
  No. Freq.   No. Freq.   No. Freq. No. Freq. No. Freq. No. Freq.   No. Freq. 
Demotion 6 0.2 5 0.19 120 0.17 11 0.18 1 0.08 7 0.15 4 0.08 
Rotation 3 0.1 5 0.19 94 0.13 7 0.11 0 0 3 0.06 11 0.22 
Promotion   
    Within firm 8 0.27 3 0.11 151 0.21 12 0.19 1 0.08 10 0.21 12 0.24 
    To parent firm 0 0 8 0.3 123 0.17 25 0.4 5 0.38 11 0.23 8 0.16 
     To the other firm within 
bureaucratic hierarchy 0 0 
 0 0  14 0.02  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
    subtotal 8 0.27 11 0.41 288 0.4 37 0.59 6 0.46 21 0.44 20 0.4 
To government entities   
    Industry bureau 0 0 4 0.15 19 0.03 1 0.02 2 0.15 5 0.1 4 0.08 
    Administration division 4 0.1 0 0 30 0.04 4 0.07 1 0.08 6 0.12 2 0.04 
    Governor of government 3 0.1 0 0 31 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.04 
    subtotal 7 0.2 4 0.15 80 0.11 5 0.09 3 0.23 11 0.22 8 0.16 
Imprisonment 1 0.03 2 0.07 59 0.08 2 0.03 1 0.08 4 0.08 4 0.08 
Others   
    as board director 1 0.03 0 0 29 0.04 0 0 2 0.15 2 0.04 2 0.04 
    as party sectary/supervisory 
committee/honorary position 4 0.13 
 0 0  34 0.05  0 0  0 0  0 0  1 0.02 
    subtotal 5 0.16 0 0 63 0.09 0 0 2 0.15 2 0.04 3 0.06 
Total 30 1   27 1   704 1   62 1   13 1   48 1   50 1 
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* Regulated industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
(to be continued)   
  H   I *   J   K   L   M 
 
Wholesale 
trade & 
Retails 
 
Banking& 
Financial 
institutes 
 Real Estate  
Social 
service 
&Infras- 
tructure 
 
Media &  
Commu- 
nication 
 Others   
  No. Freq. No. Freq. No. Freq. No. Freq. No. Freq. No. Freq. 
Demotion 7 0.1 0 0 3 0.08 4 0.11 2 0.4 7 0.1 
Rotation 12 0.18 2 0.5 5 0.14 7 0.2 2 0.4 18 0.25 
Promotion   
    Within firm 14 0.21 2 0.5 5 0.14 7 0.2 0 0 15 0.21 
    To parent firm 11 0.16 0 0 9 0.24 3 0.09 0 0 17 0.23 
     To the other firm within 
bureaucratic hierarchy 2 0.03 
 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0    
    subtotal 27 0.4 2 0.5 14 0.38 10 0.29 0 0 32 0.44 
To government entities   
    Industry bureau 3 0.04 0 0 5 0.14 5 0.14 0 0 6 0.08 
    Administration division 5 0.07 0 0 1 0.03 1 0.03 0 0 3 0.04 
    Governor of government 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.06 0 0 0 0 
    subtotal 8 0.11 0 0 6 0.17 8 0.23 0 0 9 0.12 
Imprisonment 6 0.09 0 0 6 0.16 6 0.17 1 0.2 4 0.05 
Others   
    As board director 6 0.09 0 0 1 0.03 0 0 0 0 3 0.04 
    As party sectary/supervisory 
committee/honorary position 2 0.03 
 0 0  2 0.05  0 0  0 0  0 0    
    subtotal 8 0.12 0 0 3 0.08 0 0 0 0 3 0.04 
Total 68 1   4 1   37 1   35 1   5 1   73 1 
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Table 3: summary statistics for incentive plans, firm performance measures and other variables. This table presents the mean values of firm 
performance measures and other variables for the subsample of incentive plans. The mean values of a control group, consisting of firms in which 
there was no turnover in those top managers, chairman or CEO, are also provided. Then the difference between the incentive group and control 
group is computed in the next column with t-test in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  Control group   Demotion   Rotation   Promotion   Government   Imprisonment   Other 
  Mean   Mean Diff. (t-test)   Mean Diff. (t-test)   Mean Diff. (t-test)   Mean Diff. (t-test)   Mean Diff. (t-test)   Mean Diff. (t-test) 
Panel A: Preceding firm performance & Characteristics 
ROAit 0.029  0.017 -0.012(2.09**)  0.017 -0.012(1.92*)  0.029 0(-0.06)  0.027 -0.002(0.23)  0.014 -0.015(1.12)  0.015 -0.014(2.43**) 
ROAit-1 0.03  0.018 -0.012(1.78*)  0.03 0(-0.01)  0.037 0.007(-2.39**)  0.031 0.001(-0.15)  0.026 -0.004(0.24)  0.01 -0.02(2.55**) 
RPEit-1 0.0001  -0.008 -0.008(1.28)  0 -0.0001(0.12)  0.006 0.006(-2.01**)  -0.003 -0.0031(0.45)  -0.002 -0.002(0.12)  -0.019 -0.02(2.28**) 
Sizeit 21.44  21.22 -0.22(2.33**)  21.3 -0.14(1.66*)  21.45 0.01(-0.07)  21.38 -0.06(0.56)  21.48 0.04(-0.22)  21.21 -0.23(1.41) 
DAit 0.061  0.049 -0.012(0.95)  0.036 -0.025(2.87***) 0.056 -0.005(0.87)  0.047 -0.014(1.25)  0.067 0.006(-0.50)  0.081 0.02(-0.92) 
Ownershipit 0.338  0.347 0.009(-0.30)  0.374 0.036(-1.96**)  0.338 0(0.06)  0.318 -0.02(1.18)  0.322 -0.016(0.57)  0.289 -0.05(1.65) 
Indusmbit 2.333  2.533 0.2(-1.59)  2.626 0.293(-2.06**)  2.434 0.101(-1.67*)  2.458 0.125(-1.07)  2.482 0.149(-0.89)  2.241 -0.092(0.70) 
Age 48.82  44.92 -3.9(4.63***)  45.73 -3.09(3.91***)  47.1 -1.72(3.17***)  46.1 -2.72(3.62***)  44.97 -3.85(2.84***)  45.71 -3.11(2.22**) 
Employeeit 7.588  7.088 -0.5(2.34**)  7.135 -0.453(2.50**)  7.453 -0.135(1.32)  7.27 -0.318(1.92*)  7.398 -0.19(0.70)  7.635 0.047(-0.17) 
GDPit 7433.2  7629.6 196.4(-0.27)  7651.6 218.4(-0.31)  6359.7 -1074(3.66***)  7493.7 60.5(-0.12)  9488.7 2055.5(-2.49**) 8060.6 627.4(-0.64) 
HHIit 0.075  0.07 -0.005(0.85)  0.077 0.002(-0.15)  0.079 0.004(-0.74)  0.095 0.02(-1.75*)  0.09 0.015(-0.94)  0.056 -0.019(4.03***) 
Panel B: Post- Firm Value 
Tobinq 0 yr 
after turnover  1.692 
 1.591 -0.101(1.18)  1.655 -0.037(0.43)  1.834 0.142(-1.79*)  1.825 0.133(-1.23)  1.622 -0.07(0.62)  1.608 -0.084(0.50) 
Tobinq 1 yr 
after turnover 1.628 
 1.445 -0.183(2.75***) 1.616 -0.012(0.14)  1.692 0.064(-0.82)  1.777 0.149(-1.40)  1.639 0.011(-0.10)  1.483 -0.145(0.99) 
Tobinq 2 yr 
after turnover 1.823 
 1.59 -0.233(2.71***) 1.768 -0.055(0.63)  1.805 -0.018(0.22)  2.048 0.225(-1.62)  1.706 -0.117(1.13)  1.568 -0.255 (2.04**) 
Tobinq 3 yr 
after turnover 1.998 
 1.792 -0.206(1.85*)  1.943 -0.055(0.61)  1.95 -0.048(0.64)  2.133 0.135(-1.08)  1.892 -0.106(0.77)  1.59 -0.408(4.31***) 
Obs. # 1621   49   63   193   71   35   24 
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Table 4: regression results of the relation between the incentive plans and preceding firm performance measures. This table reports the results of a 
logistic regression. The dependent variable is the likelihood of one of incentive plans – demotion, rotation, promotion, entering government, 
imprisonment, or others. The independent variables include the preceding firm performance (preceding RPE) and the preceding firm characteristics, 
personal feature and institutional factors as control variables. The industry dummy and year dummy variables are also included, but for the sake of 
brevity, their results are not reported in the table. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  Demotion   Rotation   Promotion   Government   Imprisonment   Other 
Intercept 7 7.31 -2.82 -2.74 -12.12 -11.83  -13.21 -13.48 -13.94 -14.09 -7.5 -7.69 
 (0.975) (0.974) (0.987) (0.988) (0.948) (0.950)  (0.943) (0.941) (0.950) (0.948) (0.969) (0.968) 
ROAit-1 -0.39 -0.95 3.19   -3 -3.81 -1.46  
 (0.895) (0.739) (0.093*)   (0.147) (0.090*) (0.708)  
RPEit-1  1.13 -0.44 3.82  -3.62 -4.09 -2.53 
  (0.747) (0.891) (0.060**)  (0.126) (0.123) (0.552) 
Sizeit-1 -0.49 -0.50 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03  0.26 0.27 0.39 0.39 -0.36 -0.36 
 (0.058*) (0.050**) (0.975) (0.954) (0.782) (0.819)  (0.174) (0.173) (0.112) (0.116) (0.347) (0.356) 
DAit-1 -0.47 -0.45 -3.44 -3.42 -1.63 -1.66  -1.44 -1.44 -0.66 -0.60 3.41 3.45 
 (0.840) (0.848) (0.237) (0.239) (0.166) (0.159)  (0.463) (0.463) (0.792) (0.810) (0.200) (0.194) 
Ownershipit-1 0.35 0.34 2.62 2.61 -0.52 -0.48  0.15 0.13 -0.95 -1.00 -0.63 -0.67 
 (0.765) (0.771) (0.004***) (0.004***) (0.365) (0.400)  (0.873) (0.888) (0.463) (0.440) (0.724) (0.707) 
Indusmbit-1 -0.35 -0.35 0.002 0.001 -0.11 -0.12  -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.18 0.18 
 (0.266) (0.259) (0.991) (0.996) (0.516) (0.493)  (0.866) (0.882) (0.831) (0.845) (0.757) (0.751) 
Age -1.95 -1.97 -2.45 -2.45 -0.01 -0.04  -1.16 -1.12 -2.47 -2.43 -0.92 -0.89 
 (0.075*) (0.072*) (0.017**) (0.017**) (0.983) (0.947)  (0.201) (0.220) (0.038**) (0.041**) (0.553) (0.569) 
Employeeit-1 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.01  -0.14 -0.14 -0.32 -0.32 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.562) (0.601) (0.567) (0.577) (0.874) (0.857)  (0.221) (0.227) (0.040**) (0.041**) (0.838) (0.827) 
GDPit-1 -0.04 -0.04 0.097 0.10 -0.33 -0.34  -0.05 -0.05 0.68 0.68 -0.27 -0.28 
 (0.889) (0.889) (0.718) (0.714) (0.008***) (0.007***)  (0.807) (0.820) (0.038**) (0.037**) (0.385) (0.376) 
HHIit-1 0.34 0.36 -5.21 -5.19 2.83 2.86  3.05 2.98 -1.5 -1.53 -4.68 -4.78 
 (0.915) (0.909) (0.120) (0.120) (0.058*) (0.056*)  (0.096*) (0.105) (0.631) (0.622) (0.596) (0.589) 
Year_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indus_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quasi R-
square 0.01 0.01 
 0.03 0.03  0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 
Obs. # 2056   2056   2056   2056   2056   2056 
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Table 5: regression analyses of the effect of the incentive plans with RPE on the post- firm performance in a full sample. This table reports the results of a multivariate regression. 
The dependent variable is post-performance - the average Tobin’s q of 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years after the incentive plan being implemented. The independent variables include the 
dummy variable of one incentive scheme (X), relative performance evaluation (RPE) and interaction of the incentive scheme (X) and RPE. If one incentive scheme is chosen as test 
variable, then the remainders are included as control variables. For example, when the “promotion” is the test variable, the remainders – the dummy variable of demotion, rotation, 
entering government, imprisonment, or others are the control variables. The industry dummy and year dummy variables are also included, but for the sake of brevity, their results 
are not reported in the table. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Independent 
Variables 
  X   
Incentvie 
_Dummy 
Year_ 
Dummy 
Indus_ 
Dummy 
Adj. 
R-
square 
  
Intercept Demo- tion Rotation 
Promo- 
tion 
Govern- 
ment 
Imprison- 
ment Other RPEit-1 X*RPEit-1 
Obs. 
# 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Tobinq 1 year after the turnover  
 1.69 -0.15 1.44 0.27 Yes Yes Yes 0.14 2056 
 (<.001***) (-1.00) (0.001***) (0.950) 
 1.7  -0.33 1.56 -10.91 Yes Yes Yes 0.14 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.014***) (<.001***) (0.012***) 
 1.69  0.08 1.54 -1.72 Yes Yes Yes 0.14 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.293) (<.001***) (0.343) 
 1.69  0.09 1.55 -2.78 Yes Yes Yes 0.14 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.44) (<.001***) (0.209) 
 1.69  -0.11 1.46 -0.27 Yes Yes Yes 0.14 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.507) (<.001***) (0.889) 
 1.69  0.05 1.42 6.01 Yes Yes Yes 0.14 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.813) (<.001***) (0.419)     
Panel B: Dependent variable is Tobinq 2 year after the turnover  
 1.47 -0.14 1.14 0.41 Yes Yes Yes 0.23 2056 
 (<.001***) (0.356) (0.013***) (0.929) 
 1.47  -0.39 1.21 -5.61 Yes Yes Yes 0.23 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.006***) (0.009***) (0.227) 
 1.47  0.06 1.18 -0.64 Yes Yes Yes 0.23 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.484) (0.012***) (0.739) 
 1.47  0.21 1.36 -5.61 Yes Yes Yes 0.23 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.100*) (0.004***) (0.017**) 
 1.47  -0.25 1.15 0.01 Yes Yes Yes 0.23 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.138) (0.015**) (0.995) 
 1.47  -0.15 1.12 7.06 Yes Yes Yes 0.23 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.525) (0.014***) (0.374)    
Panel C: Dependent variable is Tobinq 3 year after the turnover  
 1.27 -0.15 1.03 -0.59 Yes Yes Yes 0.25 2056 
 (<.001***) (0.279) (0.015**) (0.889) 
 1.27  -0.29 1.06 -3.65 Yes Yes Yes 0.25 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.029**) (0.012***) (0.392) 
 1.27  0.05 1.01 0.26 Yes Yes Yes 0.25 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.487) (0.020**) (0.885) 
 1.27  0.15 1.08 -1.49 Yes Yes Yes 0.25 2056 
 (<.001***)  (0.195) (0.012***) (0.493) 
 1.27  -0.22 1.14 -2.29 Yes Yes Yes 0.25 2056 
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 (<.001***)  (0.153) (0.008***) (0.221) 
 1.27  -0.27 1 8.76 Yes Yes Yes 0.25 2056 
  (<.001***)           (0.218) (0.018**) (0.230)           
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Table 6: regression analyses of the effect of the promotion incentive with RPE on the post- firm performance in a subsample partitioned by the extent of market 
competition of the region. The dependent variable is post-performance - the average Tobin’s q of 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years after the adoption of incentive plan. The 
independent variables include the dummy variable of promotion incentive, relative performance evaluation (RPE) and interaction of the promotion incentive and 
RPE. Then the remainders – the dummy variable of demotion, rotation, entering government, imprisonment, or others are included as control variables. The industry 
dummy and year dummy variables are also included. Panel A partitions the sample into high- and low-competition subsamples by the yearly median value of the 
number of firms listed in a given region (province) (LLSV, 1997). Panel B partitions the sample by the yearly median value of stock market capitalization in a region 
(province) (LLSV, 1997). Panel C divides the sample by the yearly median value of the number of initial public offerings of equity in a region (province) (LLSV, 
1997). Panel D partitions the sample by the yearly median value of the regional Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ) in a region (province) (DeFond and Park, 
1999). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Panel A: partition the sample into high- and low- competitive region according to the number of listed firms in the region of year  (LLSV, 1997) 
 Tobinq 1 yr after turnover   Tobinq 2 yr after turnover   Tobinq 3yr after turnover 
 High Low High Low High Low 
Intercept 1.64 2.08 1.38 1.91 1.12 1.71 
 (<.001***) (<.001***) (<.001***) (<.001***) (<.001***) (<.001***) 
Promotion -0.01 0.35 -0.02 0.29 0.04 0.09 
 (0.890) (0.040**) (0.852) (0.089*) (0.631) (0.574) 
RPEit-1 1.41 1.67 1.23 0.48 1.09 0.34 
 (0.003***) (0.226) (0.014***) (0.736) (0.017**) (0.803) 
Promotion*RPEit-1 -2.61 17.57 -1.51 13.55 -0.46 6.93 
 (0.154) (0.026**) (0.445) (0.096*) (0.798) (0.372) 
Incentive_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indus_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 
Obs. # 1646 410 1646 410 1646 410 
Panel B: partition the sample into high- and low- competitive region according to the stock market capitalization in the region of year  (LLSV, 1997) 
 High Low High Low High Low 
Intercept 1.7 2.05 1.32 1.97 1.06 1.74 
 (<.001***) (<.001***) (0.001***) (0.001***) (0.004***) (<.001***) 
Promotion -0.01 0.31 -0.01 0.31 0.04 0.16 
 (0.930) (0.072*) (0.898) (0.070*) (0.670) (0.318) 
RPEit-1 1.19 2.75 1.21 0.35 1.06 0.25 
 (0.011***) (0.033**) (0.019**) (0.779) (0.024**) (0.833) 
Promotion*RPEit-1 -2.44 18.86 -1.56 16.79 -0.46 9.74 
 (0.178) (0.026**) (0.436) (0.040**) (0.800) (0.204) 
Incentive_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indus_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.23 
Obs. # 1628 428 1628 428 1628 428 
Panel C: partition the sample into high- and low- competitive region according to the number of initial public offerings of equity in a region of year (LLSV, 1997) 
 High Low High Low High Low 
Intercept 1.70 1.96 1.42 1.53 1.15 1.34 
 (<.001***) (<.001***) (<.001***) (<.001***) (<.001***) (0.001***) 
Promotion -0.005 0.02 -0.05 0.14 0.03 0.03 
 (0.958) (0.893) (0.540) (0.424) (0.777) (0.879) 
RPEit-1 1.00 1.98 0.19 2.82 -0.03 3.91 
 (0.03**) (0.025**) (0.675) (0.010***) (0.943) (0.002***) 
Promotion*RPEit-1 -1.89 1.69 -0.19 2.69 0.67 3.54 
 (0.278) (0.686) (0.911) (0.601) (0.710) (0.553) 
Incentive_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indus_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.19 
Obs. # 1767 289 1767 289 1767 289 
Panel D: partition the sample into high- and low- competitive region according to the regional HHI of year (DP, 1999) 
 High Low High Low High Low 
Intercept 1.46 1.70 0.99 1.60 0.77 1.37 
 (<.001***) (<.001***) (0.012***) (<.001***) (0.033**) (<.001***) 
Promotion -0.05 0.46 -0.03 0.32 0.03 0.13 
 (0.557) (0.001***) (0.739) (0.05**) (0.709) (0.403) 
RPEit-1 1.67 0.59 1.47 -0.28 1.24 0.48 
 (0.001***) (0.543) (0.005***) (0.801) (0.011***) (0.639) 
Promotion*RPEit-1 -3.08 8.64 -1.81 7.63 -0.80 6.50 
 (0.117) (0.085*) (0.376) (0.188) (0.672) (0.215) 
Incentive_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indus_Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-square 0.15 0.11 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.28 
Obs. # 1524 532   1524 532   1524 532 
45 
 
 
